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Rewterz penetration testing services help organizations determine if a cyber attacker can gain access to their critical assets while giving them detailed insights of the overall business impact of a cyber attack.
Before Rewterz got its start, the market was in dire need of a specialized and dedicated information security company. It was nearly impossible for businesses to find a trustworthy provider that could truly cover all of their bases. We wanted to meet this need, giving companies across the globe a chance to get ahead while knowing that their data is in good hands.
Severity
High
Analysis Summary
Another victim has fallen prey to the infamous attack of Triton malware which emerged on the scene in 2017 attacking the Saudi oil giant Petro Rabigh. The name of the company has not been revealed yet and the company has remained tight lipped on any damage if – any was achieved.
Background Information
Triton also known as Tritis, has been specifically designed to target specific type of industrial control system (ICS), namely Triconex safety instrumented systems (SIS) controllers developed by Schneider Electric.
Attack Information
After maintaining presence in the targeted network for over a year, before gaining access to the engineering network, performed thorough reconnaissance and moving laterally through the system, the attackers focused on gaining access to the operational side of the industrial system. The group did not take any data, screenshots and did not use any form of keylogger.
The group used custom and generic tools to avoid antivirus software and to facilitate different stages of the attack. Mimikatz and SecHack were used to harvest credentials. Attackers switched to custom backdoors in the IT and OT networks of the victim just before gaining access to an SIS engineering workstation.
It is believed that the attack was meant to cause physical damage, but due to Triton’s activities it closed down the plant due to manipulation of SIS systems which caused them to enter a failed safe state.
Triton’s operators renamed files to appear legitimate such as Microsoft update and made use of both webshells and SSH tunnels to perform their activities and drop additional tools.
“Once the actor gained access to the targeted SIS controllers, they appeared to focus solely on maintaining access while attempting to successfully deploy Triton,” says the report.
The operators of Triton in order to remain undiscovered and to minimize the risk, kept their activities off-time.
The attackers also gained access of the Distributed control system (DCS) which would have provided them with the information of the on plant operations and processes, however the attackers sole focus was to solely to hit SIS controller.
Indicators of Compromise
Filename
Malware Hash (MD5/SHA1/SH256)
Affected Vendors
Schneider Electric
Remediation
Block the threat indicators at their respective controls.