Rewterz Threat Alert – Triton Malware Resurfaced Again Hitting Industrial Control System

Severity

High

Analysis Summary

Another victim has fallen prey to the infamous attack of Triton malware which emerged on the scene in 2017 attacking the Saudi oil giant Petro Rabigh. The name of the company has not been revealed yet and the company has remained tight lipped on any damage if – any was achieved.

Background Information

Triton also known as Tritis, has been specifically designed to target specific type of industrial control system (ICS), namely Triconex safety instrumented systems (SIS) controllers developed by Schneider Electric.

Attack Information

After maintaining presence in the targeted network for over a year, before gaining access to the engineering network, performed thorough reconnaissance and moving laterally through the system, the attackers focused on gaining access to the operational side of the industrial system. The group did not take any data, screenshots and did not use any form of keylogger.

The group used custom and generic tools to avoid antivirus software and to facilitate different stages of the attack. Mimikatz and SecHack were used to harvest credentials. Attackers switched to custom backdoors in the IT and OT networks of the victim just before gaining access to an SIS engineering workstation.

It is believed that the attack was meant to cause physical damage, but due to Triton’s activities it closed down the plant due to manipulation of SIS systems which caused them to enter a failed safe state.

Triton’s operators renamed files to appear legitimate such as Microsoft update and made use of both webshells and SSH tunnels to perform their activities and drop additional tools.

“Once the actor gained access to the targeted SIS controllers, they appeared to focus solely on maintaining access while attempting to successfully deploy Triton,” says the report.

The operators of Triton in order to remain undiscovered and to minimize the risk, kept their activities off-time.

The attackers also gained access of the Distributed control system (DCS) which would have provided them with the information of the on plant operations and processes, however the attackers sole focus was to solely to hit SIS controller.

Indicators of Compromise

Filename

• KB77846376.exe
• KB77846376.exe.x64
• Netexec.exe
• svchostpla.exe
• compattelprerunner.exe
• compattelprerunner.exe
• compattelprerunner.exe
• ProgramDataUpdater.xml
• napupdatedb.exe
• alg.exe
• tquery.dll
• txflog.dll
• cryptopp.dll
• DEFAULT
• DEFAULT.BAK
• spl32.exe
• WinSAT.exe
• clusapi.dll
• PolicMan.dll
• verifier2.dll
• misc.mof
• logoff.aspx
• flogon.js

Malware Hash (MD5/SHA1/SH256)

• 47f9cc543905a69a423f9110ae7deffb
• 87648aad45d9142d1d825d728b7aa098f92aea38698209d038ba58b7385f8df6
• ee477fdee8b6ad4fe778a6fa4058f9aa
• 2141b526a81bb87b964880e69933aad3932131ccccee5949d2a16c1e124ccdbb
• aca94bb7bdfb735f267f083e28f4db37
• c55e63f8a3b328c3ba77cebf821bdc5243b15a0298057e75f7605d0922c8d7cd
• 1904cad4927541e47d453becbd934bf0
• 70efbd074326e7bbd4e851ded5c362fe5fe06282ed4bbb4b9f761f1b12ee32f7
• 121772100e46dde2d6317b08c7a59e13
• 910b26c942c0cff8b1f5a57e1521801bfd54c8cbcfd23d3d11ea9fe27ca4a0e9
• 35f443608fc4eeb78f9347a9dfc5aea1
• 1330594c2685fe6fc2c87439ef151dfacabc78402379a73be39953048b144960
• 10fd713eb3bc6a8f7abd7030104d0ce7
• 6ab948ec61f1f7e04119da85d5263d428a1de070edad3a4e796bada2ab05cea7
• 648223034bda28c415a8deeb74dcb3ef
• 4c2383c8650112e00cb8b52d0faac7b98207073db081dbdcbb278f0470b869a1
• c744006ebaaf25cd7fad0ebba56e4f84
• 6d2d9623762f822949eef80b02f4ba2d26227eb23ad5b8d1a0a3d6da3bc60d6c
• ba51f25db03a66c658d1fd4396f32843
• 0fc391cdef0705f032109e16f8f591e1e6f8ffccbc46f4eb4a8fa058047c0adc
• af5b9c9e4c6bfc6cb7fa5e4b04da8dc8
• 970fab66733ba594b435cf345c72814ee5f8443c44d28ef251f768ad66a6c052
• 2d11be6755b80cfca5c2f5138881ff25
• fc5b4c61f66beb58a62636ab7c198e6ab7f38ce201f098f2818a5699b8aa1138
• de2e1d59c81a2798a239baaa1edc0dd8
• 1848d26e47ee4937ef02e67a447b4054d66f4d659f1fbd8bda1482dc4f02c7c4
• 31cd0738ec2e40ff086dfd84ac2510fb
• 98da0ce88de897e1b08733ac771edab5e5b2a2dda8aab0e73c1d41bade275ff6
• 8db693f75a0cfe043a5810f799654cf9
• f0dcbc83d911c382da7ba06a027bdd5861d1a9b723ebe5d9d6f6b79d7b7 0f29d
• 9a7234078559093e06c9d32148ed95a3
• 32f5d0a454c26e8aa6f4cad58f3782337cc97cfe2305bbfe564437e5f0d51bbc
• 30a9ee20052fcc34dee6b09f9210d4ed
• f7bdddbeae239305ccca3b7eb1019b713bd0f7f060976494e810917a1e6ad5ee
• 519098f3970d57b8429a9f6baeaf0f8c
• 1f1902e4482527824ef2c0c2039162db85e5a671caf0767a695116b03cfc866d
• 62831f960fe764f090d1201033202438
• 1d359163b6bd882ae4c26854d69745136a23f3abb7c96341f6d17e18a546a5fd
• 685776e0020ad9bfc4e2f4f7c7a9c623
• 3b6fd091b956b17476990c6ca77dd8f77d203d3170745d1b7c7894bfcf629b86
• d05702c4c3924b08bac5079add4e2347
• 720ef3d5b5416974376ca4ea8bd536e9eeb608f89e3b5b264e197266be8a9f4e
• f985fd0d36ab79bfccfaed6d64c5fc23
• 084c21e75fbfa5056fec913c237ce7fba314f88fbd687e8dcb1e777003f79b0e
• 6fbeb6a9f990402bf6f056c892fefcc6
• 9224c2b00e94e5c57d63820aebe613843b5c851a027488148308fac2d02206f0
• 6f8b33cb1d101c6bf0e9aeaf29b7e72d
• 7633b4178611e28aedfa365a0de8ebe5f41ae8eeee71322f04d0e30e50ba2914
• 5efbd51044fb90c6231438c51d83037f
• 7bcca38e43f3b37b1acea05899a7c11dfb62de64531bd48af992d5e400a1755f
• 915efc70a812c1cb35b29ba0ecb7c48d
• 0da4c0b83fa1ad4af9aad6c42feecc6c21c3fd0e660b9e5b3857ddeae3473d54
• 0f144e79ea8d8b66fa973e0568415501
• f81aa77d23ca6662efb3e6e33538a60e39abb5ca66102e07ffa318a6d6cd78ec

Affected Vendors

Schneider Electric

Remediation

Block the threat indicators at their respective controls.